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MENTALLY ILL MURDERERS: AN ORWELLIAN
SOLUTION FROM A SOUTHERN STATE
In 1986 the Supreme Court decided that it is unconstitutional
to execute convicted murderers who have become insane while on
death row.' In an effort to circumvent this ruling, the State of
Louisiana seeks to medicate forcibly Michael Owen Perry, an
incompetent capital murderer, by injecting him with psychotropic
drugs against his will and that of his doctors.2 This Comment
attempts to articulate and explore some of the difficult and
compelling issues presented by this case.
This Comment will first discuss the facts which led up to the
case at hand. It will then engage in an analysis of whether
Louisiana's treatment of Perry is constitutional under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment by examining
recent federal decisional law decided under that provision. A
discussion of inmates' privacy interests and possible countervailing
state interests under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and cases
decided under them will follow. Finally, this Comment analyzes the
relevant Louisiana statutory provisions that govern medication of
inmates and concludes that forced medication of inmates was not
contemplated by those statutes. Traditional rationales used to justify
capital punishment also fail to support Perry's medication order. The
overall analysis shows that forced medication to achieve competency
for execution is unconstitutional and immoral, and that Perry's
medication order must be vacated.
I. FAcrs OF MICHAEL OWEN PERRY V. STATE OF LOUISIANA

Michael Perry was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid
schizophrenia 3 in 1981, when he was sixteen.4 During his
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
v. Perry, 545 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1989), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 449

2 State

(1990), rehearing denied, 111 S. Ct. 804 (1991).
3 Paranoid schizophrenia is a serious mental disorder. It is characterized by the
presence of one or more of the following general symptoms of schizophrenia:

hallucinations, combined with a preoccupation with one or more specific delusions
which relate to a single theme, unfocused anxiety, anger and argumentativeness.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASs'N: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERS 197 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
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adolescence, Perry began to exhibit bizarre and anti-social behavior
which resulted in his being civilly committed three times by his
parents.' Perry repeatedly escaped his confinement at Louisiana's
Central State Hospital; his last escape was on the day of his most
recent judicial commitment.6 Infuriated at his parents' repeated
attempts to confine him, and forced to live in a trailer behind their
home due to his extreme and antisocial behavior, a disturbed and
angry Perry killed his parents and three other family members on
July 17, 1983.'
After the police found Perry in Washington, D.C.,8 he was
brought back to Louisiana to stand trial for the murders. Michael
Perry's competence to stand trial was an issue from the beginning. 9
After being diagnosed as being afflicted with a schizoaffective
disorder"0 and showing signs of delusional behavior for months,1
' Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, Perry v. Louisiana, 545 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1989),
vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 449 (1990) [hereinafter Brief for Perry].
I Id. This behavior included burning his clothing and living in his car rather
than in the family home. Id. Perry's sister also exhibited mental illness severe
enough to warrant civil commitment when she was an adolescent. State v. Perry,
502 So. 2d 543, 562 (La. 1986).
6 Brief for Perry at 3. Perry was civilly committed three separate times. He
was consistently diagnosed with schizophrenia throughout his commitments. Id.
at 2-20.
7 State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 546 (La. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987).
On that fateful day, Perry entered his cousins' house in Lake Arthur, Louisiana, in
the early morning and shot two of them at point blank range while they lay
sleeping. He then proceeded to his parents' nearby home to wait for their return.
When they arrived home, Perry shot and killed his mother, his father, and their
two year old grandson. Id.
8 Id. Perry took his father's car and $3000 cash and fled to Washington, D.C.
after the murders. He lived in a hotel there until July 31, 1983, when he was
captured by the police. Id.
' In October 1983, Perry was committed to Feliciana Forensic Facility for
treatment to restore him to competency after the trial court judge found him
incompetent to stand trial. Brief for Perry at 3.
"0First introduced to describe a subtype of schizophrenia, this term is used to
describe an individual who at times exhibits symptoms of schizophrenia and at
other times exhibits symptoms of mood disorders, such as depressed or manic
moods. The disease is almost always chronic, but is not considered as serious as
schizophrenia. DSM-III-R, supra note 3, at 209.
" A delusion is defined as an irrational belief which continues to be held by the
believer even when contrary evidence is presented. Id. at 395. Perry claimed that
"the robots told [me] to kill [my] family." Brief for Perry at 4. He also stated that
he did not think he had enough blood, that he was being fed human body parts
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Perry's treating physician, Dr. Theresita Jiminez, found him
"delusional but able to [understand] his rights as a defendant and
[describe] the nature of the charges against him,2 and, therefore,
competent to stand trial for the murders.13
Upon this evaluation, Perry was returned to the trial
jurisdiction where yet another competency hearing was held. 4 At
the end of this hearing, and against the advice of his counsel, Perry
withdrew his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity."5 Although
evidence of the serious delusions he experienced throughout his pretrial hospitalization 6 was presented at trial, in the jury's opinion
this mitigating circumstance apparently did not outweigh the
shocking nature of the multiple murders. At the sentencing phase the
jury recommended that Perry suffer the death penalty. 7
After the jury found Perry guilty of having committed the
murders, it was permitted to recommend the death sentence upon a
finding of one of two aggravating circumstances: (1) that the
defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to
more than one person, or (2) that the murders were committed in an
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner."8
The jury's
recommendation of the death penalty was based on its finding that
both of these circumstances existed. 9 On automatic review, the
Louisiana Supreme Court found that because testimony of Perry's
mental illness was conflicting, there was a question of fact for the
(at the hospital), and that shooting him in the head would not kill him. Id. at 3-4.
12 Brief for Perry at 5.
"The legal standard for competency to stand trial was first enunciated in
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1959), as a three prong analysis. The
defendant must (1) demonstrate an ability to consult with counsel, (2) rationally
understand the proceedings against him or her, and (3) factually understand the
proceedings against him or her. Id. at 402. Another prong was added to the test
in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), requiring that the defendant be able to
assist counsel in preparing a defense.
"State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 547 (La. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987).
Id. Perry originally had entered a dual plea of not guilty and not guilty by

reason of insanity. Id.
16 Perry explained that the murders resulted from his need to break all of the
Biblical ten commandments. He also denied being present in Louisiana at the time
of the murders, and shaved his eyebrows to "increase the oxygen to his brain."
Brief for Perry at 4.
'" Perry, 502

18LA. REV.

So. 2d at 562.

STAT. ANN.

§ 14.30 (West 1989).

"9Perry, 502 So. 2d at 561.
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jury, but that the jury had decided to believe the state's experts
rather than the defendant's. 0 The court, therefore, found no error
in the jury's sentencing determination on that (or any other)
ground.21
As a result of that trial and sentencing, Michael Perry has
been incarcerated in the Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP) since
December 20, 1985.2 The LSP doctors were immediately put on
notice of his mental condition and placed Perry on Haldol, a
psychotropic drug,3 to control his schizophrenia.24 Throughout
his stay at LSP, Perry repeatedly exhibited psychotic' behavior and
was admitted to the hospital for treatment with psychotropic
drugs. 6 At times he refused this medication and at others he took
it without protest; Perry's episodes of psychosis, however, were only
loosely related to his level of medication at any one time.' Hence,
although Perry has been medicated with psychotropic drugs
throughout his incarceration, it has been only with his consent and
at all times under responsible medical supervision. Perry was
released from the hospital on January 27, 1988, with a report which
indicated that he knew of his impending execution and that the
" Id. The state's experts claimed that Perry's mental disease was not so
overwhelming as to make him unable to control his actions. Id.
21 Id.
" Brief for Perry at 5.
Synonymous with "neuroleptic" and "antipsychotic," psychotropic drugs are
commonly used to manage the symptoms of thought disorders such as Perry's.
Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and American Medical Association
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2 n.3 (quoting PHYSICIANs DESK
REFERENCE 1282-86 (44th ed. 1990) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]. The possible side
effects from such drugs include tardive dyskinesia (a neurological disorder causing
involuntary muscle spasms in the face), Parkinsonian symptoms (stiffness, drooling,
tremors, shuffling gait), and other nonmuscular side effects including exhaustion,
low blood pressure, dizziness, blurred vision and disorders of the digestive tract.
PHYSICIANs DEsK REFERENCE 1333-34 (45th ed. 1991).
2 Brief for Perry at 5.
2' 'Psychotic' is defined as a gross impairment of the afflicted person's
perceptions of reality. The presence of either delusions or hallucinations is direct
evidence of psychotic behavior. DSM-IlI-R, supra note 3, at 404-05.
2 Brief for Perry at 5-12.
' Id. at 10. For example, in November, 1987, while being medicated with
Haldol, Perry summoned the doctor and asked that his foot be cut off. Perry
claimed that a worm which he swallowed as a child told him to make this demand.
Id.
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execution would kill him.' But only two days later, on January 29,
Perry was disruptive, delusional and certain that his doctor was
going to murder him."
Perry's case was heard by the Louisiana Supreme Court on
direct appeal. Although the court affirmed Perry's conviction, it
restated the Louisiana rule against executing incompetents' ° and
recommended a hearing to determine Perry's competence prior to his
execution.3 On the basis of this decision and Perry's hospitalization
record as a whole, the trial court ordered a hearing to take place in
April 1988, to determine Perry's competence for execution.32
Three psychiatrists and one psychologist testified at that
hearing, and all agreed on the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder,
a "major mental illness which is incurable."' The first to testify was
Perry's treating physician, Dr. Jiminez, who stated that, although the
Haldol did limit Perry's delusions and hallucinations to some degree,
it did not relieve his symptoms altogether.'
Dr. Aris Cox, a
consulting psychiatrist at LSP who had treated Perry numerous
times, found that the medication helped Perry a great deal, but said
he had always thought that Perry exhibited psychotic thought
patterns even when he was under the influence of high doses of
medication.' The third medical doctor, Dr. Glenn Estes, stated that
Perry was delusional and unable to comprehend his pending
execution. 36
Testimony by Dr. Curtis Vincent, a forensic
psychologist, was similar. He stated "that Michael was psychotic and

'

Id. at 12.

29id.

30State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 564 (La. 1986) (quoting State v. Allen, 15 So. 2d
870 (La. 1943)) (convicted capital murderer became insane while on death row and,
for that reason, could not be legally executed).
31Id.

Brief for Perry at 13.
Id. at 14. For a definition of schizoaffective disorder, see supra note 10.
3 Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 17-18. Dr. Cox further testified that Perry's competence is fleeting and
that his mental status tends "to change, it's very labile, it moves about." Id.
mId. at 19-20. Dr. Estes testified that Perry "was not completely aware of the
nature of the proceedings against him.... ." He was unable to conclude that Perry
understood his sentence. Id. at 21. Dr. Estes' overall impression of Perry was that
32

'

his behavior was disruptive, he was restless, he had difficulty in perceiving
chronological order, he claimed to be God, and was only occasionally aware that
he was mentally ill. Id. at 19.
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'
not competent to be executed."37
In August the court requested that the doctors reexamine
Perry and testify at another hearing, this one to take place on
The court also ordered that Perry be
September 30, 1988.'
medicated forcibly with Haldol until at least that date, over the
objections of defense counsel.39 Dr. Cox testified that on September
7, when he saw Perry, he was worse even though he was under
medication.' Dr. Jiminez saw Perry on September 13 and 26 and
found that although he had stabilized, the improvement was solely
a result of the forced administration of Haldol, rather than an
indication that Perry was actually recovering from his illness.41
The state also called forth a medical witness, Dr. Kay Kovac,
the family practitioner in charge of LSP.4 Although (or because)
she had seen Perry for only fifteen minutes and possessed no
expertise in the field of criminal forensics, Dr. Kovac testified that
Perry was "appropriate and not delusional."' 3 On the basis of these
hearings (and apparently Dr. Kovac's testimony), the trial court
found it "obvious... that the defendant is competent for execution

when maintained on... Haldol"" and therefore ordered that

...

the LSP doctors medicate Perry with Haldol, forcibly if necessary,
and without interruption, until his execution is carried out.' After
the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Perry both an appeal' and a
3' Brief for Perry at 18. After interviewing Perry, Dr. Vincent was unconvinced

that Perry was aware of his role in the murders. Id.
38

id. at 21.

- Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court later stayed the mandatory medication
order, but Perry was subsequently medicated anyway, by force and without the
consent of his treating physician. Id. at 22.

Id. at 22-23. Although Dr. Cox thought that Perry was aware that he was to
be executed, he found that Perry was unable to assist in his legal defense according
to the Louisiana standards for trial competency. Furthermore, Dr. Cox felt that his
previous description of Perry's mental state as a 'moving target' was still applicable.

Id.
"' Brief for Perry at 23.
42 Id. at 22.
'4 Id. Dr. Kovac also stated that she had not seen Perry frequently during his
incarceration, and that while she was aware of the existence of psychotropic drugs,
she did not know if they would be effective on Perry. Id.
" Id. at 23.
45

id.

' State v. Perry, 543 So. 2d 487 (La. 1989). Three justices dissented from the

denial of the writ and denial of rehearing. Id.
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rehearing4 7 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
March 1990.48
The issues presented by Perry v. Louisiana are critical and the
possible ramifications innumerable. On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, Perry argued that his forced medication amounted
to additional punishment not sanctioned by the Eighth Amendment,
because the order allows for no exercise of professional judgment,
and the medication is to be administered not for therapy but solely
to further his execution. 49 He also argued that his Fourteenth
Amendment privacy rights are violated when the medication is
administered against his will.' Moreover, Perry claimed that forced
medication to achieve competency for execution is contrary to federal
decisional law and state statutory law as well.5 ' The following
analysis attempts to show that these and other assertions in Perry's
favor are legally correct.
II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS

A. Ford v. Wainwright

Punishments prohibited under the Eighth Amendment are
not limited to only those recognized at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted. 2 The words 'cruel and unusual' are to be construed
liberally,5 and "draw [their] meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."'
Execution of the insane is illegal by statute or common law in all fifty
' State v. Perry, 545 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1989), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 449

(1990).
8

Id.

"' Brief for Perry at 24-25.
'0 Id. at 25.
5'Id. at
52Trop

24-25.
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (revoking native-born American's
citizenship for one day military desertion is cruel and unusual within the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment).

Id. at 100-01.
' Id. at 101. See also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (state's
53

mandatory death sentence violates Eighth Amendment); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

153 (1976) (although death penalty is not unconstitutional per se, it can be found
to violate Eighth Amendment proportionality requirement).
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JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. IX

states.'r
In Ford v. Wainwright,' the Supreme Court proclaimed that
a death row inmate who was sane at the time of his crime and
conviction of murder could not be executed because he developed a
schizophrenic illness while on death row.' The Court found that
this illness precluded Ford from understanding that he would be
executed or the reason for the punishment.' Writing for the Court,
Justice Marshall observed that execution of the insane has
consistently been prohibited since the late fifteenth century.' The
Court also found that the nationwide prohibition in the United States
was evidence that execution of incompetent inmates is contrary to
the Eighth Amendment.' ° Although Ford would seem to control the
question of the permissibility of Perry's execution, the state of
Louisiana seeks to circumvent Ford's holding by forcing Perry into
55 WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN Scotr, CRIMINAL LAW § 4.4(c) (2d ed. 1986).
Explanations for this exemption include concerns that the convict, if sane, could
assist his or her counsel with a defense which the convict does not remember or
is unable to formulate due to his mental incompetence. Unwillingness to execute
a convict who fails to understand that he has been found guilty and should be
punished reflects the sentiment that insanity is sufficient punishment in itself, that
the mentally ill have a right be treated, and that the traditional goals of punishment
are not served by the execution. Id.
56 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
7 Id.

s Id. Six years after he was incarcerated, Ford's behavior became bizarre.
Among Ford's delusions, he referred to himself as Pope John Paul III and thought
that many of his family members and some celebrities were being held hostage in
the prison where he was incarcerated. Id. at 402. Unlike Michael Perry, Ford had
exhibited no signs of mental disease prior to his incarceration. Id. at 401. This
would seem to support the State's accusations that Ford may be malingering,
strengthening an argument that he fabricated his disease to be spared from
execution. The extensive documentation of Perry's longstanding illness would
seem to preclude this possibility, making it more obvious that Perry should be
spared the death penalty.
19 Id. at 406-08 (citing EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTEs (6th ed. 1680); MATTHEW HALE,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736); WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2 (7th ed.
1795)).
' Id. at 409-10. The court then held that Florida's procedures to determine
competency for execution (and thus Ford's competency for execution) were
constitutionally insufficient. Id.

19921
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competency through psychotropic medication.6
The state's
argument is that if the forced medication is effective in restoring
Perry to competency, he will not be in Ford's position and therefore
his execution presumably would be constitutional.
B. Supreme Court Decisions
1. The Verdict of Guilty but Mentally Ill. - Beginning in 1975, some
states began to recognize a new plea and verdict called Guilty But
Mentally Ill (GBMI).' 2
A jury which renders this verdict
acknowledges the fact of the defendant's mental illness, but finds him
or her guilty of the crime charged despite that illness.'
The
defendant can therefore be sentenced to the maximum penalty
allowed by the state, which, depending upon the jurisdiction, could
include capital punishment." The verdict is a hybrid one in that
the defendant who has also been found to suffer from a mental
illness will theoretically receive treatment while incarcerated. 63
However, since treatment is not guaranteed (or often administered),
the verdict essentially operates as an appealing jury compromise: a
permissible guilty verdict for a mentally ill defendant.' The verdict
of GBMI is allegedly most proper when the defendant "was sane
enough to be held responsible for her act, but [ ]her act was in part
61 See Brief for the State of Louisiana, Perry v. State of Louisiana, 545 So. 2d

1049 (La. 1989), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 449 (1990), rehearing denied, 111 S.
Ct. 804 (1991), No. 89-5120 [hereinafter Brief for State]. "[A]s long as Perry is
treated with medication, he is competent to be executed." Id. at 20. See supranotes
50-55 and accompanying text for argument that the state's position on this point is
inerror.
' Anne S. Emanuel, Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdicts and the Death Penalty: An
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 68 N.C. L. REv. 37 (1989); see also LAFAVE & SCOIT,
supra note 55, at § 4.5(h).
Emanuel, supra note 62, at 54.
"Id. at 38.
ld. at 41 n.26 (quoting People v. Carter, 481 N.E.2d 1012, 1020 (Ill.
Is
1985)
("Although there is no guarantee that defendant will be treated as the trial court
suggested, the fact that defendant was found [GBMI] does guarantee defendant the
benefit of being characterized as in need of treatment as the legislature intended.")).
See also Linda C. Fentiman, "Guilty But Mentally Ill": The Real Verdict is Guilty, 26
B.C. L. REv. 601 (1985) (no states guarantee treatment and studies show less than
half of GBMI convicts receive it).
"Emanuel, supra note 62, at 44-45.
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a result of mental illness .... ,,67 Unfortunately, the GBMI verdict
fails to recognize that defendants who are successful in presenting
defenses of diminished capacity' have traditionally been allowed
to use that determination to mitigate punishment."
Twelve states recognize the GBMI plea and verdict, ten of
which also have capital punishment7 ° In adopting GBMI, none of
these legislatures addressed the possibility of sentencing persons
with diminished capacity to death.' This poor legislative drafting
has resulted in at least two cases in which GBMI inmates are
awaiting execution: People v. Crews,' and Harris v. State.'
The majority opinions in Crews and Harrisboth found that,
although there was evidence of mental illness presented at trial
sufficient to support a plea of GBMI, a mere 'mental illness' did not
preclude capital punishment. 4 The logical underpinnings for these
holdings was purportedly legislative intent, however, the dissenting
opinions in both cases indicated that the legislative history was
unclear regarding whether any legislative attention was paid to the
67 Id. at 58. Critics of the guilty but mentally ill verdict assert that it is a
compromise verdict, and that it was adopted to appease those who want to abolish
the 'not guilty by reason of insanity' verdict. Fentiman, supra note 65, at 635.
Also known as 'diminished responsibility,' this term refers to a lack of mental
capacity to achieve the state of mind requisite for the commission of a particular
crime. In practice, this means that the trier of fact may consider the defendant's
state of mind to mitigate either the level of punishment or the degree of crime,
even though the impairment fails to rise to the level of legal insanity. BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 412 (5th ed. 1979).
Emanuel, supra note 62, at 37-38.
Id. Following are the twelve state statutes which authorize the verdict of
guilty but mentally ill: ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030 (Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN.,
tit.11, § 408 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-35 to -36 (Burns 1983); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 504 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36
(1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT ANN. § 314 (Purdon
1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (Law. Coop. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
23A-7-2 (Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-1 (Supp. 1989). Of the states which
allow the GBMI verdict, only Alaska and Michigan do not permit capital
punishment. Emanuel, supra note 62, at 37 n.2.
' Emanuel, supra note 62, at 47 n.72.
7 522 N.E.2d 1167 (Ill. 1988) (death penalty statute not unconstitutional or
excessive as applied to GBMI convicted murderer), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989).
7499
N.E.2d 723 (Ind. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987) (death penalty as
applied to GBMI convicted rapist and murderer not unreasonable or inappropriate).
74 Crews, 522 N.E.2d at 1172-74; Harris,499 N.E.2d at 726.
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interplay between the death penalty and GBMI.' In light of the
apparent legislative confusion, the dissenters felt that in any case the
spirit of GBMI statutes, with their emphasis on treatment, was at
odds with the purpose of the death penalty statutes.76 The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Crews and Harris.'
Because both denials were handed down after Ford's mandate that
executing the insane is unconstitutional, they indicate an increased
willingness by the Supreme Court to allow execution of the mentally
impaired.
2. Further CertiorariDenials to Death Row Inmates. - There are two
recent cases in which death row inmates who allege that they have
become mentally ill since sentencing have been denied competency
hearings in the state system and denied certiorari by the Supreme
Court.' In Lowenfield, the petitioner evidenced his current mental
condition with testimony from a licensed clinical psychologist, Dr.
Marc L. Zimmerman." After interviewing and testing Lowenfield
for five hours, Dr. Zimmerman stated that "it is highly probable that
Mr. Lowenfield is suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.. . ," and
that he is currently unable to understand the death penalty.' In the
opinion of a majority of the Court, this evidence did not present a
sufficient showing to afford Lowenfield the benefit of a sanity
commission hearing.8'
Similarly, in Johnson v. Cabana,82 petitioner sought to
introduce evidence of his recently developed mental illness through
75Crews, 522 N.E.2d at 1182; Harris, 499 N.E.2d at 731.
76 Crews, 522 N.E.2d at 1182; Harris,499 N.E.2d at 731.
When considered as a whole, the [GBMI statute] represents a
legislative vision that all persons found guilty but mentally ill at

the time of the offense have an illness of the mind which has a
nexus with criminal behavior which when properly diagnosed

and treated will lead to better conduct. This view is at odds
with the vision of human worthlessness which is basic in the

death sentence statute.
Harris,499 N.E.2d at 732 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
77See supra notes 72-73.
'5 Johnson v. Cabana, 818 F.2d 333 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1061 (1987);
Lowenfield v. Butler, 495 So. 2d 1245 (La. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 995 (1988).
Lowenfield, 485 U.S. 995 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
°Id.
81Id.

' 818 F.2d 333 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1061 (1987).
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the testimony of a licensed clinical psychologist.' This psychologist
interviewed Johnson for five hours, read statements by people who
knew Johnson, and reviewed Johnson's past medical records, after
which he testified that "Johnson is unable to relate any punishment
through execution to his own conduct... [and] [i]t is quite clear that
this is a product of mental disease or defect."" Again, a majority
of the Court denied a petition for certiorari to review the lower
court's determination that Johnson had not met his evidentiary
burden when moving for a competency hearing." In dissent,
Justice Brennan observed that if Johnson's showing "[is] insufficient
to raise [incompetency] under Ford, then it is hard to imagine what
would."'
These two cases reveal a Court which is willing to
severely erode, if not totally eradicate, Ford's explicit blanket
prohibition on executing the insane. 7
III. THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENS PROTECTIONS

A. Limited Circumstances Justify Forced Medication
1. Requirement of Dangerousness. - Under federal decisional law, a
patient who has been civilly committed to a mental institution has a
limited right to be free from unwanted medication, especially
psychotropic medication.' Rennie v. Klein was one of the earlier
cases to define this privacy right, grounding it in the concepts of due
process and personal security. 9 The court, in describing the
countervailing state interest, said "[t]he state may override [the
Johnson, 481 U.S. at 1062 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. The psychologist diagnosed Johnson's illness as organic brain syndrome,
a hereditary disease which affects his personality and behavior. Id.
5

Id.
Id. at 1063 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Furthermore, the Court recently decided that the execution of retarded
persons is "not necessarily" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Penry v.
Lynaugi, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (death penalty not unconstitutional as applied to man
with 'mental age of a 6 year old' convicted of murder). Although mental

retardation and mental illness are far from identical conditions for purposes of
diagnosis and treatment, they are perceived by the criminal law as being similar
in analyzing issues of responsibility. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 55, at § 4.7. It
is therefore reasonable to view the Penry decision as further erosion of the Ford

mandate.
8

Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).

8

Id. at 842.
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privacy] right when the patient is a danger to himself or others, but
in non-emergency situations must first provide procedural due
process."''9 The court further found that the right to be free from
unwanted medication is particularly critical in the case of
administration of psychotropic medication. 1
In making this
determination, the court paid particular attention to the severe and
not uncommon side effects associated with psychotropic drugs.9
To determine which patients could be treated forcibly, the court
recommended a "careful balancing of the patient's interest with those
[interests] to be furthered by administering the psychotropic
drug," and concluded that the procedures observed by the state of
New Jersey adequately comported with due process to safeguard the
privacy interest."
2. The ProfessionalJudgment Standard.- In 1982 the Supreme Court
decided that a severely mentally retarded patient could be restrained
forcibly only if the restraint was dictated by reasonable professional
judgment." The court articulated a balancing test to determine
Id. at 838. See also Aldrich v. Thompson McKinnon Sec. Inc., 589 F. Supp. 683
(1984) (patient who sets fires and exhibits other types of dangerous, disruptive
behavior when not medicated may be forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs);
Osgood v. District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026 (1983) (forcible administration
of Haldol justified by state interest in safety of patient, her doctors and other
inmates).
Rennie, 653 F.2d at 843.

Id. Although the court noted that there is considerable disagreement within
the medical community regarding the frequency of the more serious side effects,
it felt that they were pervasive enough to warrant "deep concern." Id. at 842 n.8.
See supra note 23 for an overview of the side effects identified with psychotropic
medications.
"Rennie, 653 F.2d at 847.

New Jersey provides for a series of informal consultations by the patient's
treating physicians and the hospital director to determine whether the patient's
refusal will be honored. Involuntary treatment is allowed only if the patient could
not participate in any realistic treatment plan without it or if the patient presents
a significant danger to him or herself or others without the medication. Id. at 848.
See also Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979) (civilly committed
psychiatric patients presumptively able to make treatment decisions and may not
be forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs unless danger to self or others is

posed).
" Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (soft arm restraint of often violent
and severely retarded adult, with mental capacity of an eighteen month old child,
held constitutional when patient suffered sixty-three self inflicted injuries within
two years of confinement).
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whether the invasion of the patient's liberty interest was justified by
"the demands of an organized society."' The court recognized that
the patient, Romeo, had a constitutional interest in avoiding bodily
restraint, but deferred to professional judgment of the treating
physicians when determining the necessity of a particular restraint9
The professional judgment standard was further developed
in a 1988 case, United States v. Charters." Charters was concerned
with the forced medication of a pre-trial detainee, Michael Charters,
who was indicted for making threats against President Ronald
Reagan." He was later adjudged incompetent to stand trial."
Charters remained incompetent for three years after his initial
detainment, and the government eventually moved for an order of
forcible treatment with psychotropic medication with the hope that
it would make him competent to stand trial. 1 Although a threejudge panel from the Fourth Circuit had recommended that Charters
be allowed to refuse such medication," on rehearing en banc their
decision was vacated.1" Rather than recognizing Charters' right to
be free from unwanted medication, the Fourth Circuit en banc
allowed him only the right to "the exercise of professional judgment
by those who have the responsibility for making medical decisions
that affect his retained liberty interests."'"4 Charters was, therefore,
Id. at 320.

ld. at 323. The Court specifically stated that "the decision, if made by a
professional, is presumptively valid." Id. The obvious problems with this standard
are that often, as in Perry,doctors testifying on both sides of a litigation purport to
hold opposing views regarding the proper treatment of the patient involved.

9 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
9

Id. at 304.

IId. Charters was sent to the federal forensic hospital at Butner, North
Carolina to be treated until competent. He was returned to the court five times
where he was repeatedly determined to be dangerous and incompetent and sent
back to Butner. Id.
101 Id.

United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987). Charters' refusal to
assent to such medication was based upon his fear of potential side effects. The
panel decision found his concerns realistic and based their decision on Charters'
valid interest in avoiding such severe medical complications. Id. See also Bea v.
Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1984) (pre-trial
detainee suffering from schizophrenia has due process right to refuse treatment
with psychotropic drugs).
102

10 Charters, 863 F.2d at 314.
"o

Id. at 312 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
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deprived of the right to make his own medication decisions, and
constrained to rely on state doctors to make his decisions for him,
even though he was not so severely retarded as to be literally unable
to make decisions such as the patient in Youngberg."°
The state of Louisiana does not claim that Michael Perry is
dangerous to himself or others without psychotropic medication.1°
The professional judgment standard was apparently unrecognized by
the judge who implemented Perry's medication order, in that the
court ordered the medication to be forcibly and continuously
administered until Perry's execution were accomplished."
Although, presumably Perry's treating physicians could alter the
particular type of psychotropic medication used and the dosage of
medicine under the court order, they could not discontinue
medication altogether even if it were determined that such a course
of treatment would be in Perry's best interest."° The order to
medicate Michael Perry therefore does not comport with the two
recognized justifications for forced medication of civilly committed
patients.
B. Prisoners' Rights to Refuse PsychotropicMedication
In 1980 the Supreme Court determined in Vitek v. Jones1"'
that the involuntary commission of a prison inmate -to a mental
hospital sufficiently implicated Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
interests to require a judicial hearing on the matter."' The Court,
in an opinion by Justice White, found that although inmates of a
penal institution do not retain all of their constitutional rights,
involuntary commitment to a mental hospital is "qualitatively
different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person
convicted of crime, ... [and] is not within the range of conditions of
11
confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual.'
105 Id.
106 See generally Brief for State; State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543 (La. 1986).
107 Brief for Perry at 21.
"o Id. at 24. The order did not actually guarantee Perry's treating physicians the
authority to change the dosage or eliminate the medication altogether. Id. at 23.

10 445

U.S. 480 (1980).
110 Id.
...
Id. at 493. Justice White also observed that none of the Court's prior

decisions entitled the state to involuntarily commit a convicted prisoner to a mental
hospital in addition to his/her confinement in the prescribed penal institution. Id.
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Because of these differences in the mode of confinement, Vitek held
that the state must afford prisoners who face commitment additional
due process protections." 2 The Vitek district court identified some
of the minimum protections the state must provide in these
circumstances, including written notice to the inmate, a hearing held
sufficiently after the notice to allow the prisoner time to prepare,
opportunity to rebut the state's witnesses at the hearing, and an
independent tribunal.'
The court also emphasized that the state
of relative helplessness in which a prisoner suspected of having a
mental disease finds his or herself presents a proportionally greater
need for the mentally ill inmate to be afforded adequate due process
protections.""
In light of the Vitek court's mandate of stringent due process
protections when faced with an involuntary commitment of a prisoner,
one would anticipate that an inmate such as Perry, facing the
potentially devastating consequences of involuntary psychotropic
medication, would be afforded similar (if not more comprehensive)
due process protections. Recently, however, in Washington v.
Harper,"' the Supreme Court held that, although prisoners retain
a qualified right to refuse medication, inmates facing possible
involuntary medication do not deserve more stringent procedural
protection than that enunciated in Vitek." 6 The court further
indicated that Fourteenth Amendment standards can be satisfied
with even less procedural protection." 7
In Harper,a schizophrenic inmate consented to psychotropic
medication during his incarceration but subsequently withdrew his
consent."8 The treating physician then attempted to forcibly
medicate Harper by referring to the 'Policy,' a prison procedure
allowing forced medication when the inmate has been determined (1)
to suffer from a "mental disorder" and (2) to be "gravely disabled" or
112

Id. at 494.

at 494-95 (quoting Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. 569, 575 (D. Neb. 1978)).
Id. at 497.
11 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
11 Id. at 235. The Court made this determination despite its recognition of the
severe side effects associated with psychotropic drugs. Before refusing the
treatment, Harper had consented to medication with various forms of such drugs
and exhibited some of the side effects associated with them. Id. at 229-30.
"Id.
11

"

Id. at 222. ("[T]he Due Process Clause confers upon respondent no greater

right than that recognized under state law.").
118Id.

at 214.
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pose a likelihood of serious harm "to himself, others, or their
property.""' 9 Furthermore, the state required a hearing before a
committee of mental health professionals and periodic review of any
medication order by the same committee. 20 Although the two
required factors were arguably present in Harper's case, the
Washington Supreme Court still held the 'Policy' to be violative of
Harper's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.' 2' It reasoned
that the invasive nature of psychotropic medication demands a
judicial hearing and therefore the administrative1 procedures
instituted by the state were not sufficiently protective. '
The State of Washington appealed this decision to the United
States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari" and reversed.
Although the Court found that the inmate had a "significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
drugs,"124 it reasoned that Harper had been given adequate
protection by the state's administrative scheme and found that
medicating him was "reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests."'" The Court based its decision primarily on Harper's
proven dangerousness to himself and other prison inmates. 26 It
also determined that the state has a duty to provide its prisoners
with medical attention which is consonant with both the medical
needs of the inmate and the institutional needs of the prison.2 7
119
Harper, 494 U.S. at 215. Harper suffered from a manic-depressive disorder
and he attacked two nurses while on parole, evidencing his illness and potential
dangerousness. Id. at 214.'
1Id. at 215-16.
12 Id. at 218.
" Id. The Washington Supreme Court further declared that the judicial hearing
should have the "full panoply of adversarial procedural protections [and] the State
[must] prove[ ]by 'clear, cogent, and convincing' evidence that the administration
of antipsychotic medication was both necessary and effective for furthering a
compelling state interest." Id.
'
12

489 U.S. 1064 (1989).
Harper, 494 U.S. at 221.

Id. at 223 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (standard for
determining validity of a prison regulation claimed to infringe on constitutional
rights is reasonableness in relation to state penological interests)).
" Id. at 225.

Id. See also White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing
state's compelling interest in forcing medication to counteract inmate
dangerousness); Osgood v. District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026 (D.D.C. 1983)
(forced antipsychotic medication allowed when inmate highly dangerous and
'
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Recent decisional law shows a general judicial refusal to
recognize other interests which states have proffered to overcome
inmates' refusal of forcible medication with psychotropic drugs."2
United States v. Watson" 9 held that an inmate may be forced to
ingest psychotropic drugs to control him within the prison
population, but specifically rejected the state's contention that it can
forcibly medicate the inmate
to "improve [his] condition sufficiently
13
to enable his release."'
Another case decided in 1990, White v. Napoleon,"' held that
"convicted prisoners, like involuntarily committed mental patients,
retain a limited right to refuse treatment and a related right to be
32
informed of the proposed treatment and viable alternatives.'
White was a class action brought by inmates who alleged that their
prison physician mistreated them and ignored their valid medical
complaints, often forcing unwanted and unnecessary treatment upon
them." In determining the proper limitation on the inmates' right
to refusal, the court drew a parallel between the state's interest in
operating a hospital and its interest in operating a prison.'
The
court then concluded that the modes of operation were similar
enough to allow the same state interests to limit the right to refusal:
professional judgment and valid medical or penological
threatening to kill various prison authorities).
" In re Woodall, 257 Cal. Rptr. 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (must be danger to
others to overcome need for patient's consent); People v. Medina 705 P.2d 961

(Colo. 1985) (possibility of future danger not enough to warrant antipsychotic
medication of inmate without consent); Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass.
1981) (state interest in removing obstacles to development does not outweigh
fundamental individual right to refuse medical treatment with antipsychotic drugs).
12 893 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1990) (prisoners suffering from mental disease or defect
have qualified right to refuse antipsychotic medication unless needed to control
inmate within prison population).
" Id. at 980. The court here observes that this justification by the state makes
little sense considering that the inmate has stated that he will not continue to take
the medication after release, so any medical improvements gained thereby will be
immediately lost. Id.
IM 897 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1990).

Id. at 113.

132

" Id. The physician allegedly intentionally harmed various patients by treating
them with medication to which they were allergic, burning one with matches, and
ignoring treatment instructions from the prisoners' prior doctors. Id. at 108.
11

Id. at 113.
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objectives. 35

A United States District Court case, Girouard v. O'Brien,13

re-emphasized the importance of a determination of dangerousness
in allowing an inmate to be forcibly medicated with psychotropic
drugs. The inmate, Girouard, was diagnosed as suffering from
undifferentiated schizophrenia."
He was forcibly medicated
throughout his incarceration, despite his refusal to consent to
psychotropic medication.1 39 The court held that the state had
violated Girouard's constitutional rights, declaring that "[m]edication
should not be administered as a means of controlling "anti-social" or

"disruptive" behavior, but only if the inmate poses a danger to
himself or to others, and after attempting to use the least restrictive
alternative."140
An overview of federal decisional law indicates that an order

to forcibly medicate a prisoner for the purpose of achieving
competency for execution is wholly unsupported. Deprived of any
procedural protection, 14 1 Michael Perry faces forced administration

of psychotropic drugs until the state of Louisiana sees fit to execute
him, regardless of his treating physicians' not unlikely determination
that discontinuing or modifying the medication would be in Perry's
135

Id.

" No. 83-3316-0, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4342 (D. Kan. April 4, 1988).
Id. at '8.
" Id.at '2. This was Girouard's first diagnosis after entering the penal system.
By the time this case was on trial, a determination had been made by both his and
the government's expert witnesses that Girouard was indeed not suffering from
schizophrenia and therefore treatment with psychotropic drugs was never beneficial
for him. Id. at *16. 'Undifferentiated' schizophrenia is defined as a type of
schizophrenia in which there are delusions, hallucinations and incoherence, but no
symptoms of paranoid, catatonic or disorganized schizophrenia. DSM-III-R, supra
note 3, at 198..
' Girouard,1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4342 at *2-'8. Some of the reasons for this
forced medication cited by the state included: boisterous behavior, loudness,
vulgarity, laughing inappropriately and disruptiveness. Id.
4 Id. at '15-'16. The court also noted that, "[aibsent an emergency... forcible
medication with antipsychotic drugs is [not] reasonably related to the concededly
legitimate goals of jail safety and security." Id.at *8(quoting Bee v. Greaves, 744
F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984)). See also Osgood v. District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp.
1026 (D.D.C. 1983) (inmate forcibly injected with psychotropic drugs although she
objected on the religious ground that she was a Christian Scientist).
" When the order to medicate was entered, Perry's counsel moved for a
hearing on the issue of medication and moved to have the medication order stayed.
Both motions were denied. Brief for Perry at 21-22.
137

560

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. IX

best interests. 1'
IV. LOUISIANA STATUTES WHICH CONCERN
MEDICATION OF INMATES

Louisiana's Code for Criminal Procedure is concerned with
treating mentally diseased inmates rather than using medication
solely to execute them.'"3 Ranging from a statute concerned with
disposition of pre-trial detainees who are incompetent to stand
trial,1'" to a provision prescribing rules for forced medication of
inmates," the overall emphasis is on an effort to cure the prisoner
of his or her illness rather than to use medication as a punishment
and a means to the most destructive end, execution.
In accordance with the provision dealing with incompetent
pre-trial detainees," where the detainee is "unlikely in the
foreseeable future to be capable of standing trial, the court shall

order commitment ...to a medically suitable treatment facility."'47

Although this statute is intended to deal with pre-trial matters, the
judge in State v. Perry interpreted it as the proper standard with
which to determine Perry's competency for execution on (postconviction) appeal.'"
Louisiana law does permit forcible medication of prison
inmates, but only when (1) the inmate is mentally ill or retarded and
(2) a physician certifies that medication is necessary to prevent harm
to the inmate or others.'49 If these two criteria are met (and they
are not in Michael Perry's case) then the medication can be forced,
'a

Because Perry has often exhibited severe adverse side effects from the drugs

and does not always respond to them, such a medical determination is entirely
possible in his case. Id. at 14-20.
143LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 648 (West 1988).
144
id.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:830.1 (West 1987).
'4 LA. CODE CRIM. PROc. art. 648 (West 1988).
" Id. This section further provides that such an order will be deemed a civil
comnitment. Id.
State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 563-64 (La. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872
(1987); see also Brief for Perry at 41. This statute was previously applied to a postconviction proceeding in State v. Henson, 351 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1977).
149LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:830:1 (West 1987).
"5
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but only for fifteen days." Throughout these provisions, the theme
is treatment for the mentally ill inmate, presumably in an effort to
cure him or her. The court order to medicate Perry is not in the
interest of curing Perry, it is in the interest of killing him, because it
does not allow for a contrary medical decision to be
implemented.5 1
Finally, the Louisiana statutory provision dealing with
general use of medication mandates that medication be used only for
treating disease.15 2 That statute states, "No medication may be
administered to a patient except upon the order of a physician ....
[m]edication shall not be used for nonmedical reasons such as
punishment or for convenience of the staff."'
Medicating Michael
Perry for the sole purpose of preparing him for execution is arguably
punishment. If permitted, this method of dealing with insane death
row inmates would certainly be convenient for Louisiana because the
state would be spared the considerable expense of incarcerating (and
treating) Perry (and others in his position) for the duration of his
natural life. There is simply no support in the Louisiana statutory
scheme, however, for the use of forced psychotropic medication to
achieve competency for execution.
V. MICHAEL PERRY'S PRIVACY INTEREST

The psychotropic medication to which Perry consented was
administered solely to control his thought processes in order to make
his psychosis less severe."s Records show that Perry has never
attempted suicide, nor assaulted the staff or other inmates of the
prison or hospital.'55 His disease manifested itself primarily in the

" Id. (emphasis added). Forced medication can be permitted for longer
periods, but only if the following criteria are met: (1) a petition has been filed with
the court; (2) the petition sets forth reasons for the treatment; (3) there is a hearing
at which the inmate has a right to counsel; and (4) the court determines that the
inmate is incompetent. Id. If these procedures are adhered to, the prisoner is to
be admitted to a facility for treatment under the usual procedures for civil
commitment. Id.
" See Brief for Perry at 24.
'52 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:171 (P)
(West 1988).
153 id.
"sBrief for Perry at 3-12.
1S5Id.
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form of delusions, hallucinations and verbal outbursts." Indeed,
the state's brief in the case fails to allege the one legally acceptable
basis to force psychotropic medication upon an inmate: that Michael
Perry poses a danger to himself or others in the prison
population."7
The State of Louisiana's sole interest in restoring Perry to
mental competency is its desire to carry out Perry's death
sentence."" The state argues that the medication order is valid
because it is reasonably related to the state's interest in punishing
Perry, and that this is the proper criteria by which the order's
validity is to be judged.'5 9 It cites to Washington v. Harper"6 for
this proposition. In Harper, however, the order for forcible
medication was upheld because the prisoners were medicated
pursuant to a determination of dangerousness.""' The issue of
competency for execution did not exist in Harper,and the reasoning
in that opinion is therefore inapplicable and irrelevant to the fact
situation in Perry v. Louisiana.62
The State of Louisiana urges that accommodation of Perry's
right to refuse medication would burden the state because
"[s]upervision and care of untreated mentally ill prisoners is
considerably more difficult than supervision and care of mentally ill
prisoners who are properly treated."'" However, Louisiana forbids
its providers of medical care to use medication "for nonmedical
reasons such as punishment or for convenience ....
16'
It would
be undeniably easier for the staff of the Louisiana State Penitentiary
to control the prison population if the inmates were maintained in a
drugged stupor, but the laws of Louisiana proscribe such use of
medication.
The state's final argument rests upon the proposition that
medicating Perry is the only way it can further the state's interest in
Id. See also supra notes 5, 16, 36 and accompanying text.
1 See Brief for State. See also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); White
v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970 (8th
'

Cir. 1990).
'm

Brief for State at 43.

159 Id.

1- 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
161

16

Id. at 227.
Id. at 210.

16 Brief for State at 45.
6

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:171 (P) (emphasis added).
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carrying out Perry's sentence," in light of the wholesale
prohibition against the execution of the insane in Ford v.
Wainwright.I
However, Ford did not allude to an exception
allowing the states to circumvent its ruling by forcing psychotropic
medication (and an artificial competence) upon an unwilling
inmate. 6 ' Quite possibly, the Court recognized that the execution
of an artificially competent inmate is akin to the execution of an
insane inmate and, therefore, is equally prohibited by the
Constitution.1"

VI. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF PuNIsHMENT

A. Deterrence
Specific deterrence, also known as restraint or incarceration,
serves the function of isolating the criminal from society as a
whole.'69 Isolation of a particular criminal prevents him or her
from harming others, assuming that those criminals who are likely
recidivists can be accurately identified. 70 This theory is often used
to justify capital punishment and indeed was used by the state of
Louisiana to justify imposing the death sentence upon Michael
Perry."
However, executing Perry is not the only method of
isolating him from society. Perry could be committed to a forensic
hospital for treatment and his isolation would be complete.
General deterrence, defined as fear inspired by the
punishment of others, is also often cited as justification for capital
punishment, but its real effect is uncertain." Deterrence depends
upon many factors for its effectiveness because some criminals are
less likely to be deterred than others and because many variables
affect a particular individual's reaction to the possibility of
punishment."
The execution of an insane inmate, however,
(whether or not medicated for the appearance of competency), is
unlikely to deter sane persons, and insane persons are arguably
'

16

Brief for State at 45.
477 U.S. 399 (1986).

167 id.

'6

See supra text accompanying notes 52-61.

'" LAFAVE
170

& ScoTr, supra note 55, at § 1.5(a)(2).

id.

Brief for State at 44.
i" LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 55, at § 15(a)(4).
173 id.
17
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undeterrable. 74 Therefore, deterrence would not be served by
executing the extremely mentally ill Michael Perry.
B. Retribution
Retribution is defined as revenge for the hurt which society
suffers as a result of the criminal's behavior."
It is also seen as a
sort of justice theory - it is only fair that the murderers should 'pay'
for their crimes.17
Retribution has been cited by the state of
Louisiana as a justification for Perry's medication order.'7
However, there is little retributive value in executing an insane
person. According to Justice Thurgood Marshall, "the need to offset
a criminal act by a punishment of equivalent "moral quality" - is not
served by execution of an insane person, which has a "lesser value"
than that of the crime for which [s/]he is to be punished."'78 As Sir
Edward Coke observed centuries ago, "[w]hen a mad man is
executed, [it] should be a miserable spectacle . . . of extreme
inhumanity and cruelty ....
."'" It is unlikely that anyone
witnessing the pitiful execution of the incompetent Michael Perry
will feel that society has somehow been avenged.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although Louisiana argues its permissibility, the execution of
insane inmates is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment." ° The
state would like to circumvent this rule by way of forced medication
which results in the appearance of competence but not actual mental
competence. To allow it to do so would violate centuries of criminal
law prohibitions upon the execution of the insane, prohibitions
underpinned by humane public policy.'
Unfortunately, however,
'7' Id. See also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407 (1986) ("[The execution of
an insane person simply offends humanity... it provides no example to others
and thus contributes nothing to whatever deterrence value is intended to be served
by capital punishment.") (citing 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES (6th ed. 1680)).
"1 LAFAVE & Scor, supra note 55, at § 1.5(a)(6).
176

Id.

17

Brief for State at 44.

" Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & David W. Louisell,

Death, the State and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 387 (1962)).
3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed. 1680) (quoted in Ford, 477 U.S. at 407).
' See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
181See supra note 59.
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the United States Supreme Court seems to be retreating from the rule
it announced in Ford v. Wainwright. The reasons for this retreat
remain a mystery, since much of the erosion of Ford is accomplished
through passive judicial activism - by denying certiorari to death
row inmates who claim that they should be exempt from execution
under Ford. Perhaps, if and when the Court decides Michael Perry's
case, its reasoning will be clarified. The Court did grant certiorari in
Perry v. Louisiana,182 and eight Justices heard oral argument in
October, 1990.1" However, in lieu of rendering a substantive
decision, the Court remanded PerryM in light of Washington v.
Harper." Since Harper was violent and dangerous to himself and
others in the prison,"' that fact situation is, in this author's opinion,
sufficiently distinct from that in Perry as to make this remand
puzzling. Furthermore, Harper was decided before the Court even
granted certiorari in Perry. This raises the question why the Court
did not simply remand Perry in light of Harper in place of granting
certiorari. Perhaps the Court wanted this issue to be decided by all
nine Justices and assumed that a remand would only result in the
Louisiana Supreme Court allowing the medication order and thus in
another application for certiorari. Only time will tell.
The artificial appearance of competency under which
Louisiana seeks to justify its execution of Michael Perry is merely a
mask which disguises his underlying incapacity to understand his
punishment. The use of medication to pursue this end is unethical
and should be prohibited. Michael Owen Perry's dignity (and that
of others in his position) must not be undermined by forcing him to
be executed while in a mentally incompetent and heavily drugged
state. Should this atrocity be permitted, the price will be paid by a
society whose capacity for compassion will be inevitably and,
perhaps, irretrievably eroded.
Jennifer L. Colyer
182

494 U.S. 1015 (1990).

1" Then recently appointed Justice David Souter was not yet sitting for oral

argument when Perry was argued. The decision was also before Justice Thurgood
Marshall's retirement and Justice Clarence Thomas' subsequent appointment to the

bench.
1" 111 S. Ct. 449 (1990).
'
I

494 U.S. 210 (1990).
See supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.

